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Abstract 
Significant developments have taken place over the past few 
years in the area of vehicular communication systems in the 
ITS environment.  It is vital that, in these environments, 
security is considered in design and implementation since 
compromised vulnerabilities in one vehicle can be propagated 
to other vehicles, especially given that V2X communication is 
through an ad-hoc type network. Recently, many 
standardisation organisations have been working on creating 
international standards related to vehicular communication 
security and the so-called Internet of Vehicles (IoV). This 
paper presents a discussion of current V2X communications 
cyber security issues and standardisation approaches being 
considered by standardisation bodies such as the ISO, the 
ITU, the IEEE, and the ETSI. 
1 Introduction 
The area of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications 
has become an increasingly popular research topic within 
mobile wireless networking, and is attracting significant 
attention from governmental, research and industry 
organisations. Connected vehicle technologies aim to tackle 
some of the biggest challenges in Intelligent Transport 
Systems (ITS) in the areas of safety, mobility, and 
environment. Since ITS efficiency directly depends on V2X 
communications, a variety of cyber-threats and attacks can 
affect impact on functionality and integrity. 
 
ITS use technologies that allow road vehicles to communicate 
with other vehicles, with pedestrians and roadside 
infrastructure. These systems are also known as Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X) communications and contain three 
different types as shown: Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) 
communications; Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications; 
and Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) communications. 
 
A typical vehicular communication system used in ITS is 
responsible for exchanging data between vehicles (V2V) and 
between a vehicle and infrastructure (V2I). This can include 
information and warnings derived from the on-board sensors, 
such as current position and speed of the vehicle. In addition, 
roadside units (RSU) are able to communicate with traffic 
monitoring systems that collect and distribute warnings about 
hazardous situations. ITS implemented without appropriate 
security measures can have serious consequences when 
compromised, jeopardising traffic safety and lives of the 
drivers. The security of ITS should therefore be investigated 
in order to enable the successful deployment of V2X 
communications in an ITS environment. 
2 Related work 
Cyber security in V2X communications for ITS has been 
addressed by various researchers recently. Several surveys 
exist that discuss the research challenges regarding the 
dynamic adaptation of the security features and interplay 
between safety and security in ITS.  
 
The authors of [1] have reviewed the current research 
challenges and opportunities related to the development of 
secure and safe ITS applications. They first explore the 
architecture and main characteristics of ITS systems and 
survey the key enabling standards and projects. Then, various 
ITS security threats are analysed and classified, along with 
corresponding cryptographic countermeasures. In order to 
better investigate the issues arising from high complexity and 
communication overhead of the security algorithms, the 
authors presented a detailed ITS safety application case study 
in light of the European ETSI TC ITS standard. In [2] the 
author presents different types of communication 
technologies used in the modern IoT world, discussing issues 
and challenges, illustrated through a number of key 
applications.   
 
Various authors have identified different security 
vulnerabilities and threats and propose a range of security 
measures for ITS communications. The authors of [3] have 
presented a methodical approach to balance the security costs 
for implementing vehicular security measures against the 
security risks of corresponding automotive security attacks.  
The work is based upon well-established methodologies, 
which have been carefully adapted for ITS scenarios. The 
approach is based on the assumption that the probability of a 
successful attack on a security measure decreases with the 
increase of the attack potential required. However, they stress 
that this is only true for most, but not all, real-world scenarios 
and even if based on well-found analyses – a risk assessment 
remains a statistical estimation that inherently includes 
uncertainties.
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3 Wireless Access Technologies for V2X 
Various communications technologies are available to 
provide the radio environment required by the vehicular 
networks in ITS, such as Dedicated Short-Range 
Communications (DSRC or IEEE 802.11p), Long Term 
Evolution (LTE), Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access (WiMAX/IEEE802.16), Infrared communications, 
Bluetooth, ZigBee (IEEE 803.15.4), and so forth.  We 
describe some of the key technologies 
3.1 Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) 
Traditional IEEE 802.11 Media Access Control (MAC) 
operations suffer from significant overheads when used in 
V2X scenarios. To address the challenging V2X 
requirements, the DSRC initiative was launched. The Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) adopted the 
DSRC proposals and developed an amendment to the IEEE 
802.11, provided in 802.11p. This new amendment, specifies 
maximum delays of tens of milliseconds for high-priority 
messages. Technically, a spectrum band is allocated in 5.9 
GHz for priority road safety applications, for V2V and V2I 
communications. 
 
Work on the standardisation of additional layers includes the 
IEEE 1609.x family of standards that specify multichannel 
operation, networking services, resource manager and 
security services. The combination of IEEE 802.11p and the 
IEEE 1609 protocol suite comprise to give Wireless Access in 
Vehicular Environments (WAVE). Collectively the IEEE 
1609.x family, IEEE 802.11p and the SAE J2735 form the 
key parts of the currently proposed WAVE protocol stack. 
The WAVE protocol architecture [4], with its major 
components, is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Non-safety applications 
Safety applications 
SAE J2735 
Transport UDP/TCP WSMP 
Networking IPv6 
IEEE1609.2 (security) 
IEEE1609.3 
LLC IEEE 802.2 
MAC 
IEEE 802.11p 
IEEE1609.4 (multi-channel) 
PHY IEEE802.11p 
Figure 1: The WAVE protocol stack and its associated 
standards 
 
Although DSRC was the first standard specifically created for 
road communications, it has already identified disadvantages 
such as limited frequency spectrum available for V2V safety 
(10MHz for the United States and 30MHz for Europe); low 
reliability [5]; unbounded delay and intermittent V2I 
connectivity [6]. 
The physical layer of DSRC is compliant with the profile of 
IEEE 802.11 - orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
(OFDM) PHY specification for the 5 GHz band [7], as 
specified in details for ITS in [8] and shown in Figure 2, 
where HPPS is High Power Public Safety; Ctrl is Control 
Channel; CSL is Critical safety of live or Collision Avoidance 
Safety channel; and GB is Guard band. 
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Figure 2: DSRC frequency allocation in Europe and US 
 
There are three types of intentional interferences in V2X 
communications which can be considered as cyber security 
threats at the physical layer: jamming, spoofing, and 
meaconing. For jamming, a signal (DSRC, LTE-V, GPS, etc.) 
is continuously transmitted with enough power to prevent the 
receiver from acquiring the information within the area of 
communication. For spoofing, a deceptive signal is 
transmitted on the same frequency of V2X as the legitimate 
signal. Spoofing is intended to deceive the V2X receiver 
without being recognised, since the receiver treats the 
spoofing signal as real, though it is a counterfeit signal. For 
meaconing, this involves the retransmission of the V2X signal 
after a delaying, and broadcasting the signal in the same 
frequency as the real signal thereby confusing the ITS system 
and users. 
 
Currently, the DSRC regulatory requirements in many parts 
of the world are in the process of being finalised. It is 
important that similar spectrum allocation and requirements 
will be adopted worldwide for DSRC applications [4]. The 
3 
frequency bands known so far in Europe and USA are shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
It is recognised that the frequency spectrum dedicated for 
road safety applications in Europe is 30MHz (channels 176, 
178, and 180), in comparison with USA band allocation 
where the frequency spectrum for this application is limited to 
10MHz (channel 184). 
 
The channel number (CN) is derived by counting the number 
of 5MHz spectrum in the frequency band from 5000 MHz to 
the centre frequency f (CN) of the channel CN, i.e. 
 
  (1) 
 
The transmitter power of a DSRC unit is described by 
defining four classes of devices whose maximum 
transmission (TX) power ranges from 0dBm to 28.8dBm.  
The corresponding coverage distance by a single radio link 
depends on the channel environment, the TX power and the 
modulation and coding schemes (MCS) used. This distance 
may range from 10m to 1km. 
3.2 Long Term Evolution for V2X (LTE-V) 
Recent studies have preferred using LTE-V as the V2X 
technology, mainly because LTE cellular network 
infrastructure already exists. LTE-V, also known as LTE 
Vehicular, is a variant of LTE that has been standardised by 
3GPP in its most recent major standards update, Release 14 
[9]. LTE-V technology is considered to be one of the optimal 
choices for effective ITS communications solution mainly 
because of its low cost of deployment since it can fully utilise 
existing base stations around the world. However, LTE-V is 
still in its study phase in 3GPP, and it became a Work Item in 
3GPP Release 14 for formal standardisation. Once the 
standard is finalised, it is likely to take at least one year to 
produce a commercial chipset. Therefore, LTE-V is unlikely 
to be available for commercial application until late 2018 or 
beyond. 
 
The frequency bands used for LTE are described in a number 
of standards such as [10] and [11], however, spectrum 
harmonisation is required for global inter-operability and 
implementation of low-cost V2X services.  Some of the main 
parameters of DSRC and LTE-V networks are summarised in 
Table 1.  
 
Characteristics IEEE 802.11p LTE-V 
Coverage Intermittent Ubiquitous 
Capacity Medium High 
Mobility Medium Very high 
Network 
infrastructure 
Huge investment Existing network 
for V2I 
Frequency bands 5.9GHz ISM band 3G,4G bands 
Bit rate Up to 27Mbps Up to 2Mbps 
 
Table 1: Comparisons between DSRC/WAVE and LTE-V 
3.3 Organisations and consortiums 
Modern V2X communications are using multiple overlapping 
ad-hoc networks to operate with very high quality of service. 
They have to fulfil the requirements of the automotive 
applications in an extreme multipath environment 
(reflections, high speed of the vehicles, dynamic traffic 
scenarios, etc.). In order to solve those problems, several 
standardisation authorities have developed new standards and 
recommendations. 
 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) produces globally-applicable standards for 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), 
including fixed, mobile, radio, converged, broadcast and 
Internet technologies.  
 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Standards Association (IEEE-SA) is an organisation within 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) that 
nurtures, develops and advances global standards in a broad 
range of industries. The IEEE-SA developed 802.11p, an 
amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard, to support wireless 
access in vehicular environments (WAVE). They define 
enhancements to 802.11 that are the basis of products 
marketed as Wi-Fi required to support specificities of ITS 
applications. 
 
Standards from Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) are 
used to advance mobility engineering throughout the world. 
Their standards are internationally recognised for their role in 
helping ensure the safety, quality, and effectiveness of 
products and services across the mobility engineering 
industry. 
 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the 
United Nations specialised agency for information and 
communication technologies (ICT). The Study Groups of 
ITU’s Telecommunication Standardisation Sector (ITU-T) 
assemble experts from around the world to develop 
international standards known as ITU-T Recommendations 
which act as defining elements in the global infrastructure of 
ICT. 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
is an independent, non-governmental international 
organisation with a membership of 163 national standards 
bodies. Through its members, it brings together experts to 
share knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-based, 
market relevant International Standards that support 
innovation and provide solutions to global challenges. 
 
The ITS station reference architecture proposed by ISO is 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The ITS station reference architecture originally 
developed for CALM 
 
The CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) 
is a non-profit, industry driven organisation initiated by 
European vehicle manufacturers and supported by equipment 
suppliers, research organisations and other partners. It 
supports the creation of European standards for 
communicating vehicles spanning all brands. As a key 
contributor the C2C-CC works in close cooperation with the 
European and international standardisation organisations. In 
cooperation with infrastructure stakeholders the C2C-CC 
promotes the joint deployment of cooperative ITS. The 
vehicle manufacturers, such as Volkswagen, BMW, Renault, 
Audi, Volvo, Daimler and the Peugeot Citroen group, have 
been joined by 17 technology suppliers, such as Swarco, 
Continental, NEC, Bosch and Denso Corporation, plus 30 
academic institutions and research organisations. 
4 Cyber Security Standardisation in V2X  
There are two Harmonisation Task Groups (HTG) established 
by the EU-US International Standards Harmonisation 
Working Group: HTG1 to harmonise standards (including 
ISO, CEN, ETSI, IEEE) on security to promote cooperative 
ITS interoperability; and HTG3 to harmonise 
communications protocols. In collaboration, the two HTGs 
developed integrated set of technical reports including the 
report published by HTG1 that provides feedback for 
Standards Development Organisations and identifies areas 
where policy or regulatory action can help improve security 
[11]. 
 
CEN and ETSI are currently developing work items on 
serviceID (application identifier). Their goal is to harmonise 
serviceIDs globally (CEN, ETSI, ISO, IEEE, etc.) and to 
specify the management of the numbers (registration 
authority, etc.). ETSI STF 404 currently is doing the first step, 
i.e. developing a harmonised scheme (CEN, ETSI, ISO, 
IEEE) for serviceID. 
 
A list of security and privacy standards for ITS developed by 
ETSI are shown in Table 2. 
 
Standard title Standard number 
Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis 
(TVRA) 
ETSI TR 102 893  
Stage 3 mapping for IEEE 1609.2 ETSI TS 102 867  
Confidentiality services ETSI TS 102 943  
Trust and Privacy Management ETSI TS 102 941  
Access Control ETSI TS 102 942  
ITS communications security architecture 
and security management 
ETSI TS 102 940  
Security header and certificate formats ETSI TS 103 097  
Table 2: Base standards for security and privacy in ITS 
developed by ETSI 
 
4.1 Security architecture 
The set of CALM communication standards is built on the 
basis of the well-known layered OSI model, which was 
simplified and extended in order to define the ITS station 
reference architecture ISO-21217, which consists of six parts 
(Applications, Management, Access, Networking & 
Transport, Facilities and Security) (see Figure 3) 
 
Although security has been described as a vertical layer 
adjacent to each of the ITS layers in [8] in ETSI Technical 
Specifications for ITS communications security architecture 
and security management [12] security services are provided 
on a layer-by-layer basis. 
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Figure 4: Architectural ITS security layers defined in [12] 
 
4.2 Identity and Access Management (IdAM) frameworks 
for ITS 
In practice, cryptographic algorithms are used to provide the 
V2X ITS security requirements. These algorithms rely on 
symmetric or asymmetric keys. To use asymmetric keys, a 
ITS station has to contact a trusted Certification Authority 
(CA) to get a certificate. A number of different PKI 
infrastructures have been proposed for ITS architecture. 
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The ETSI PKI architecture specified in [13] lists security 
services for ITS stations, including enrolment services, 
authorisation services, integrity services and plausibility 
validation services (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: ETSI ITS PKI Architecture [12] 
 
In order to satisfy all the communications security services 
requirements, several elements within their functional model 
are proposed. 
 
An Enrolment Authority (EA) issues a proof of identity to 
ITS-S identifier by delivering an enrolment certificate and 
then the station requests its authorisation certificates from an 
Authorisation Authority (AA) using the received enrolment 
credentials. AA verifies ITS-S enrolment credentials with EA 
before responding with authorisation certificates. 
5 Security attacks in V2X communications 
Threat analyses of V2X communications have been 
conducted in various ITS projects [14], [15] and 
standardisation activities [16], [17]. Based on the attack 
surfaces defined in state-of-the-art we summarise three access 
perimeters which may be considered separately because of 
their specific characteristics (see Figure 6) or namely (1) 
Infrastructure domain; (2) V2X domain; and (3) In-vehicle 
domain. 
 
 
Figure 6: Simplified view of ITS environment presenting 
three of the main access domains. 
 
The infrastructure domain includes vehicle manufacturers 
(supply chain), service providers (emergency services, billing, 
etc.), and trust authorities (TA). Attacks applied at this 
domain may be platform integrity, data analysis, denial of 
service (DoS) against functionality, etc. 
 
The V2X domain is representing all the V2X 
communications, such as the communication between vehicle 
on-board unit (OBU) and road-side units (RSU) as well as the 
communication between neighbouring vehicles (V2V) or 
even V2P. Types of attacks which can be applied at this 
domain includee: Black hole, Flooding, Sybil attack, and 
jamming. 
 
The in-vehicle domain consists of the trusted platform 
modules (TPM), application units (AU), and electronic 
control units (ECU). Examples of attacks at this domain may 
be tampering or physically damage units, manipulating the in-
vehicle communications, etc.  
6 Conclusions and future work 
V2X communications in ITS are much more vulnerable to 
attack than wired networks. In V2X every vehicle node can 
move freely within the range of the V2X network and stay 
connected.  Further, each fixed node (e.g. RSU) can 
communicate with other nodes, vehicular or fixed, in either a 
single hop or multi hop. In future, it is possible that 
authentication schemes may be enhanced by using neural 
network associative memories to augment or replace 
traditional authentication schemes. 
 
It is currently under discussion whether Internet Protocol 
(IP)v6 is the only way to globally address future cars [18]. 
For safety messages normal IP has too large overhead, a 
CAM or DENM V2V message is much more compact and IP 
cannot compete with them. It has direct influence to the 
message transmission times. 
 
In many ways there is a fundamental issue with privacy 
regarding the location and nature of V2V information 
processing. Much of the ITS communications development 
work is based on data being sent to and processed in the 
cloud, which can increase the privacy risk. An alternative 
model would involve more data being processed on the 
vehicle in relation to its immediate surroundings. 
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